JUSTIFYING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN K-12 PRIVATE SCHOOLS
Sharon Hsin-Yi Lee

In this Comment, the author examines the consequences of using
identical rules to govern the affirmative action policies of both private
employers and private schools. The author explores accepted legal
justifications for private affirmative action, focusing on whether these
justifications are internal or external to the defendant. The author
contends that the Supreme Court’s dicta in Johnson v. Transportation
Agency weigh in favor of using external imbalances to justify private
affirmative action when viewed in light of developments in Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence. The author demonstrates that departing
from the affirmative-action rule for private employers – by allowing
private schools to use external racial imbalances as justifications for their
affirmative action policies – results in the most effective allocation of
incentives and means for private schools to remedy racial disparities. In
contrast to private employers and private colleges, the author proposes that
K-12 private schools be able to use external imbalances to justify their
affirmative action policies because such affirmative action benefits society
more than currently permitted forms of affirmative action.
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INTRODUCTION
Is it legal for a private school to have the mission of improving a racial group’s
educational status when that group academically underachieves? If so, is it legal for the school
to exclusively or primarily admit students of that racial group to better achieve its mission? In
reality, the answer to the second question determines the answer to the first question because a
school that cannot exclusively or primarily admit students of a particular racial group would be
severely limited in its efforts to improve that group’s educational achievement.
Although the case is now being decided en banc by the Ninth Circuit,1 the opinion of a
three-judge panel in Doe v. Kamehameha Schools2 is significant in setting forth an approach to
answering the above questions. The panel essentially held that a private school, the
Kamehameha Schools, can never use a racial preference, a Native Hawaiian3 preference, to
exclusively admit students of a particular racial group, even if that group significantly
underperforms in school.
The Kamehameha Schools have operated since 1887 as the charitable legacy of Princess
Bernice Pauahi Bishop, the last direct descendant of King Kamehameha I.4 Private and
1

Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 4167 at *1.

2

Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 416 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2005).

3

Although there is general controversy as to whether Native Hawaiians should be treated

as a race by law, the Kamehameha Schools conceded that their Native Hawaiian preference was
a racial preference. Kamehameha, 416 F.3d at 1047. Congress has found that Native Hawaiians
academically underperform. See, e.g., Native Hawaiian Education Act of 2002, 20 U.S.C. §§
7511-7517 (2005).
4

Id. at 1027.

3

nonsectarian,5 the Kamehameha Schools’ mission is “to fulfill Pauahi’s desire to create
educational opportunities in perpetuity to improve the capability and well-being of people of
Hawaiian ancestry.”6 To further its mission, the Kamehameha Schools have an 118-year-old
policy of offering admissions preference to applicants of Hawaiian ancestry.7 For its K-12
schools, the Kamehameha Schools’ admissions policy is implemented in a two-part process: the
applicant first demonstrates his academic qualifications and then completes the Ethnic Ancestry
Survey.8
John Doe had sought to be admitted but was denied admission to the Kamehameha
Schools twice. Each time he had met the academic standards and acknowledged that he
possessed no aboriginal blood.9 Doe consequently filed suit against the Kamehameha Schools.10
He alleged that the Schools’ admissions policy violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981,11 the relevant part of

5

This Comment addresses the legality of affirmative action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in

private nonsectarian schools but not private sectarian schools, to which different rules apply.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Kamehameha Schs., 848 F. Supp. 899 (D. Haw. 1993).
6

KAMEHAMEHA SCHOOLS STRATEGIC PLAN 2000-2015, at 19, available at

http://www.ksbe.edu/osp/StratPlan/EntireDocument.pdf.
7

Thomas Yoshida, Appeals Court to Rehear Admissions Policy Challenge,

http://www.ksbe.edu/article.php?story=20060222115646371.
8

Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 416 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005).

9

Id.

10

Id.

11

Id.
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which protects a person’s “right to make and enforce contracts” from racial discrimination.12
The district court, however, granted summary judgment in favor of the Schools and other
defendants because “the admissions policy constituted a valid race-conscious remedial
affirmative action program.”13 Doe appealed.14
Because the Kamehameha Schools “employ[ed] an express racial classification,” the
Ninth Circuit panel determined that its admissions policy constituted a prima facie case of
intentional race discrimination.15 In response,16 the Kamehameha Schools argued “that its policy
constitute[d] a valid affirmative action plan rationally related to redressing present imbalances in
the socioeconomic and educational achievement of native Hawaiians, producing native Hawaiian

12

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and to no other.

13

Kamehameha, 416 F.3d at 1029.

14

Kamehameha, 416 F.3d at1027.

15

Kamehameha, 416 F.3d at 1039. In Runyon v. McCray, 427 U.S. 160 (1876), the

Supreme Court determined that the right of admission to a private school falls under § 1981’s
“right to make and enforce contracts.”
16

The prima facie case of intentional race discrimination created a presumption that the

Kamehameha Schools had engaged in intentional discrimination. Kamehameha, 416 F.3d at
1039.
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leadership for community involvement, and revitalizing native Hawaiian culture.”17 However,
the panel reasoned that an affirmative action policy can justify a racial preference only when it
satisfies three requirements advanced by the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers of America
v. Weber.18 Under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Weber, affirmative action policies in the
employment context must: 1) “respond to a manifest imbalance in its work force,” 2) not create
an absolute bar to the advancement of the non-preferred race or unnecessarily trammel the rights
of the non-preferred race, and 3) do no more than is necessary to achieve a balance.19
Seeing “no basis for a different rule regarding a plan’s alleged violation of § 1981 in the
context of private education,” the panel determined that the Kamehameha Schools’ racial
preference was designed to deny admission to all students possessing no aboriginal blood so long
as a sufficient number of qualified Native Hawaiians sought admission.20 It reasoned that the
Schools’ policy effectively created an absolute bar to the attendance of those not descended from
the Hawaiian race21 and consequently failed the second prong of the Ninth Circuit’s Weber
rule.22
17

Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 416 F.3d 1025, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2005).

18

443 U.S. 193 (1979).

19

Kamehameha, 416 F.3d at 1040-41.

20

Id. (“We see no basis for a different rule regarding a plan’s alleged violation of § 1981 in

the context of private education.”); cf. id. (“We are persuaded that these general principles [for
testing the validity of an affirmative action plan] may be rationally applied in the context of
private education, with certain modifications to account for the differences of context.”).
21

Although a student not of Native Hawaiian ancestry was admitted in 2003, the Ninth

Circuit determined that his admission was by accident rather than by design. Id. at 1040 n.8.
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Although the panel did not make this clear, it effectively provided that a private school’s
affirmative action policy must: 1) respond to a manifest imbalance in its student population, 2)
not create an absolute bar to the admission of the non-preferred race or unnecessarily trammel
the rights of the non-preferred race, and 3) do no more than is necessary to achieve a balance in
its student population. Caselaw in the private employment context has established that a
manifest imbalance can be shown if there is a much smaller percentage of the preferred racial
group in the private employer’s population than the surrounding population.23 Extending the
panel’s logic of identically treating affirmative action policies in private employers and private
schools, a manifest imbalance for the purpose of justifying private-school affirmative action
should be established if there is a much smaller percentage of the preferred racial group in the
private school population than the surrounding population.
The Ninth Circuit panel did not address whether the Kamehameha Schools’ admission
policy would have been valid if it had created a significant rather than an absolute bar to the
attendance of people who are not partly Native Hawaiian.24 However, the consequence of the
22

See Kamehameha, 416 F.3d at 1041.

23

See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 646, 631-32 (1987) (reasoning that a manifest

imbalance can be determined through “a comparison of the percentage of minorities or women in
the employer’s work force with the percentage in the area labor market or general population . . .
in analyzing jobs that require no special expertise”).
24

Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 416 F.3d 1025, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Even if we

assumed that some, limited racial preferences might be appropriate in order for the Schools to
advance its mission, an absolute bar on the basis of race alone exceeds any reasonable
application of Weber, Rudebush, and the cases that followed in their wake.”).

7

panel’s decision to import the Weber rule from the private employment context to the private
education context, without change, is that the Kamehameha Schools almost certainly cannot use
any Native Hawaiian admissions preference.
Under the rule imported from Weber, the Kamehameha Schools would almost certainly
not be able to use a Native Hawaiian admissions preference because there is no manifest internal
imbalance to justify it: the percentage of Native Hawaiians in the Kamehameha Schools’
population is virtually 100 percent,25 whereas the percentage of Native Hawaiians in Hawaii is
9.4 percent.26 Thus, one specific consequence of applying identical rules to determine the
legality of affirmative action in both private employers and private schools is to handicap the
Kamehameha Schools’ ability “to fulfill Pauahi’s desire to create educational opportunities in
perpetuity to improve the capability and well-being of people of Hawaiian ancestry.”
Of significance is that this result is not logically limited to the Ninth Circuit. Other
circuits have not had the opportunity to decide what rule governs the legality of affirmative
action in private education. However, almost every circuit’s rule for affirmative action in private
employers is like the Ninth Circuit’s in that they require an affirmative action policy to be
justified by an imbalance within the employer’s workforce, in other words, an “internal

25

A student not of Native Hawaiian ancestry was admitted in 2003. Kamehameha, 416

F.3d at 1040 n.8.
26

See U.S. Census Bureau: State & County Quickfacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/

states/15000.html.
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imbalance.”27 Some circuits, however, have indicated a willingness to justify affirmative action
policies with imbalances external to the employer.28
This Comment sets aside the question of whether a private school should be able to use a
racial preference to exclusively admit students of an academically underachieving racial group.29
Instead, this Comment contends that K-12 private schools, including the Kamehameha Schools,
should be able to primarily admit students of an academically underachieving racial group
through its affirmative action policy. Such affirmative action most effectively allocates
27

See infra Part I.B. More precisely, this Comment defines internal-imbalance

justifications as those that logically cease justifying an affirmative action policy once the
percentage of the preferred race in the private entity approximates that in the local area. Under
this definition, past discrimination towards blacks or a manifest lack of Asian Americans would
be internal-imbalance justifications because the private entity has arguably made up for the past
discrimination towards blacks or the manifest lack of Asian Americans once the percentage of
the preferred race in the entity’s population approximates that in the local area. On the other
hand, the justifications of diversity and improving services to black constituencies are externalimbalance justifications because the private entity may continue to reap the benefits of diversity
and improving services to black constituencies, which result from its affirmative action policy,
even when the percentage of the preferred race in the private entity’s population approximates
that in the local area.
28

See infra Part I.B.

29

For a piece that addresses this question, see RECENT CASE: Civil Rights – Section 1981

– Ninth Circuit Holds That Private School's Remedial Admissions Policy Violates 1981. – Doe
v. Kamehameha Schools, 416 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2005), 119 Harv. L. Rev. 661 (2005).
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incentives and means to remedy racial disparities. It also confers greater benefits and fewer
burdens on society than forms of affirmative action that are presently permitted. Toward these
ends, external imbalances should legitimately justify the use of admissions preferences for
academically underachieving racial groups in K-12 private schools.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of law governing affirmative action policies
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, with a focus on currently accepted affirmative action justifications. In
Part II, I present my thesis: that both precedent and policy support the use of external imbalances
to justify admissions preferences for academically underachieving racial groups in K-12 private
schools.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF LAW GOVERNING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES UNDER § 1981

A.

Supreme Court Cases
Two Supreme Court cases, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber30 and Johnson v.

Transportation Agency,31 are the most significant precedents when considering the legality of an
affirmative action policy under § 1981.32 Although Weber and Johnson deal with the legality of
affirmative action policies under Title VII, these two cases are still on point because every

30

443 U.S. 193 (1979).

31

480 U.S. 616 (1987).

32

Constitutional claims are often present in § 1981 cases involving government defendants.

See LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 62.01 (2005), available at LEXIS, 3-62
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 62.01.
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jurisdiction either explicitly33 or implicitly34 treats affirmative action policies identically under
both Title VII35 and § 1981.
33

For jurisdictions that explicitly treat affirmative action policies identically under Title VII

and § 1981, see Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 416 F.3d 1025, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005); Schurr v.
Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 499 (3d Cir. 1999); Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d
962, 966-68 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981); McNamara v. City of Chicago,
867 F. Supp. 739, 752 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 930, 980 (E.D.
Mich. 1979), aff’d sub nom. Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1982).
34

For jurisdictions that implicitly treat affirmative action policies identically under both

Title VII and § 1981, see Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 472 (11th Cir. 1999) (for
discrimination against a black woman); Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 26 F.3d 1277,
1284 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994) (for discrimination against blacks), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1149 (1995);
Local 35, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. City of Hartford, 625 F.2d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 presupposes a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause or Title VII), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); Chance v. Bd. of Examiners, 534 F.2d
993, 998 (2d Cir. 1976) (“‘[H]aving passed scrutiny under the substantive requirements of Title
VII, the employment seniority system . . . is not violative of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.’”), cert. denied
sub nom, Council of Supervisors & Adm’rs v. Chance, 431 U.S. 965 (1977); Frost v. Chrysler
Motor Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1290, 1296-97 (W.D. Okl. 1993) (simultaneous analysis of
affirmative action plan’s validity under Title VII and § 1981); Dougherty v. Barry, 607 F. Supp.
1271, 1285-88 (D.C. 1985) (simultaneous analysis of affirmative action plan’s validity under
Title VII and § 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 869 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Banerjee v. Bd.
of Trustees, 495 F. Supp. 1148, 1156 (D. Mass. 1980) (reasoning that “the court may treat

11

In Weber, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation’s plant in Gramercy, Louisiana had
a skilled craftworker population that was 1.83% black and a local labor force that was 39%
black.36 The Gramercy plant agreed to select new craft trainees on a seniority basis, with the
proviso that at least 50% of new craft trainees were to be black until the percentage of its black

plaintiff's § 1981 claim and Title VII claim as coextensive” in the subject case where the
defendant allegedly discriminated against minority plaintiff because “the same factual predicate
is alleged to constitute a violation of both, and no suggestion has been made that the
requirements for establishing a violation of § 1981 are different in any manner from the
requirements for establishing a violation of Title VII”), aff’d, 648 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1981). The
Fourth Circuit would likely evaluate the validity of an affirmative action plan identically under
both § 1981 and Title VII, see Lewis v. Cent. Piedmont Cmty. Coll., 689 F.2d 1207, 1209 n.3
(4th Cir. 1982) (holding “that the McDonnell Douglas criteria apply equally to cases arising
under Title VII or § 1981”), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983).
35

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The most relevant

section for the issue at hand is 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), which provides that it “shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer –
“(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
“(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, be-cause of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.”
36

United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198 (1979).
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skilled craftworkers commensurated with the percentage of blacks in the local labor force.37 The
most senior black trainee had less seniority than several white production workers whose bids for
admission were rejected, including the plaintiff who instituted the action.38
The Supreme Court did not “define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible
and impermissible affirmative action plans” but concluded “that the adoption of the KaiserUSWA plan . . . falls within the area of discretion left by Title VII to the private sector
voluntarily to adopt affirmative action plans designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance
in traditionally segregated job categories.”39 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that
“the purposes of the [affirmative action] plan mirror those of [Title VII].”40 These purposes were
“to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy” and “to ‘open employment
opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them.’”41 The
court’s second reason for upholding the Kaiser-USWA plan was that “the plan does not
unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees” because the plan: 1) does not require
the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black hirees, 2) does not create
an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees, and 3) is a temporary measure.42
In Johnson, the Santa Clara County Transportation Agency voluntarily adopted an
affirmative action plan with the long-term goal of attaining a work force whose composition
37

Id. at 198-99.

38

Id. at 199.

39

Id. at 208.

40

Id.

41

United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).

42

Id.
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reflected the proportion of minorities and women in the area labor force.43 Towards this end, the
plan permitted the consideration of gender as a factor when promoting qualified applicants
within a traditionally segregated job classification in which women had been significantly
underrepresented.44 The plan did not set aside a specific number of positions for minorities or
women but required that short-range goals be established and annually adjusted to serve as the
most realistic guide for actual employment decisions.45 A female employee, Diane Joyce, was
promoted to a Skilled Craft Worker job classification over a male employee, Paul Johnson. Both
employees had been rated as well qualified for the job, but Johnson had received a 75 on his
interview and Joyce had received a 73.46
In reviewing the employment decision at issue in this case, the Supreme Court first
examined whether the decision was made pursuant to a plan prompted by concerns similar to
those of the employer in Weber and then determined whether the effect of the plan on males and
whites was comparable to the effect of the plan in Weber.47 The Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the Agency’s plan under Title VII because, first, the “consideration of the sex of
applicants for Skilled Craft jobs was justified by the existence of a ‘manifest imbalance’ that
reflected underrepresentation of women in ‘traditionally segregated job categories’” and, second,

43

Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1987).

44

Id. at 620-21.

45

Id. at 622.

46

Id. at 623-24.

47

Id. at 631.
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the Agency Plan “did not unnecessarily trammel[] the rights of male employees or create[] an
absolute bar to their advancement.”48
Proper Justifications for Private Affirmative Action49

B.

Using Weber and Johnson, lower courts have not crafted identically-phrased rules for
determining whether an affirmative action plan is legal under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in the
employment context. However, they have essentially focused on examining whether the
affirmative action plan has proper justifications and limitations.50
Virtually every circuit requires affirmative action to be justified as a response to a racial
imbalance within the employer’s workforce, but does not permit affirmative action to be justified
as a response to a racial imbalance existing outside of the employer’s workforce.51 This is
48

Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 637-38, 642 (1987).

49

While many cases and articles have focused on categorizing justifications for affirmative

action plans as either remedial or non-remedial, the categories of “external” and “internal” are
more appropriate for this Comment.
50

See infra Appendix: Survey of Rules Governing Affirmative Action Plans.

51

The Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ rules clearly indicate the requirement of an internal

imbalance, see infra Appendix. See, e.g., Davis v. City of S.F., 890 F.2d 1438, 1448 (9th Cir.
1989) (finding a manifest imbalance by “compar[ing] the percentage of minorities or women in
the employer's work force with the percentage in the area labor market or general population”);
Maitland v. Univ. of Minn., 155 F.3d 1013, 1016-17 (8th Cir. 1998) (considering whether there
was a manifest imbalance in the salaries of male and female faculty members at the University to
validate an “affirmative action salary plan”). The Second Circuit’s rule sets forth the internal
imbalance requirement more vaguely than the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ rules but also requires

15

usually true even when the face of the circuit’s rule fails to indicate that the imbalance must be
within the employer’s workforce.52
an imbalance in that particular defendant’s workforce. See e.g., Honadle v. Univ. of Va., 56 F.
Supp. 2d 419, 426 (D. Va. 1999) (“In determining whether a manifest imbalance exists for a job
requiring specialized skills, a comparison should be made between the percentage of minorities
or women in the employer's work force with those in the labor market.”).
52

The stated rules for the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh, and DC Circuits fail

to indicate that the racial imbalance must be internal to the employer, see infra Appendix, but
caselaw in these circuits have set forth this requirement. See e.g., Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n v.
City of Dallas, 150 F.3d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that manifest imbalance in the
employer’s rank of deputy chief satisfied the first prong of Weber); Bennett v. Arrington, 20 F.3d
1525, 1537 (11th Cir. 1994) (“determining whether a manifest imbalance exists that would
justify race-conscious decisionmaking by the employer involves a comparison of the percentage
of minority employees in that job” with either “the percentage of minorities in the general area
labor market” or “the labor market who possess that special skill or training”); Aiken v. City of
Memphis, 9 F.3d 461, 473 (9th Cir. 1993) (reasoning that statistics comparing defendant’s labor
force with county population and defendant’s job categories with defendant’s other job
categories established a manifest imbalance for Title VII); Hammon v. Barry, 264 U.S. App.
D.C. 1, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding no manifest imbalance by comparing the percentage of
blacks in the employer’s relevant department with the percentage of blacks in the area labor
force); Janowiak v. Corp. City of South Bend, 836 F.2d 1034, 1039 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding no
manifest imbalance established where employer did not proffer any evidence of past
discrimination nor a statistical comparison “between the relevant qualified area labor pool and

16

Although the majority of cases in the Third Circuit require an internal imbalance,53 the
Third Circuit’s analysis in Schurr v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc.54 implies that the required
manifest imbalance may exist within the employer’s workforce, the general industry, or the job
category. In Schurr, the defendant was Resorts, a casino licensee in Atlantic City, New Jersey.55
As a casino licensee, defendant was regulated by the state’s Casino Control Commission
pursuant to the Casino Control Act.56 The Casino Control Act required casino licensees to
improve the representation of “women and minorities in . . . EEOC job categories in which the
casino licensee is below the applicable employment goals” set by the Commission.57 In addition,
casino licensees were required to develop an Equal Employment and Business Opportunity Plan
to meet applicable employment goals set by the Commission and as a prerequisite to obtaining a
the employer’s workforce”); Stock v. Universal Foods Corp., 817 F. Supp. 1300, 1306-07 (D.
Md. 1993) (racial imbalance in the workforce tends to establish that the affirmative action plan is
substantially related to a remedial purpose); Bertoncini v. City of Providence, 767 F. Supp. 1194,
1202 (D. R.I. 1991) (“In deciding whether the kind of imbalance that exists justifies taking race
or gender into account, . . . ‘a comparison of the percentage of minorities or women in the
employer’s work force with the percentage in the area labor market or general population is
appropriate.’”).
53

See e.g., Jaworski v. Cheney, 771 F. Supp. 109, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (referring to a

manifest imbalance as a comparison between the employer’s jobs and the labor market).
54

Schurr v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486 (3d Cir. 1999).

55

Id. at 490.

56

Id. at 488.
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Id. at 489.
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casino license.58 The Commission stated that the purpose underlying the Casino Control Act and
similar regulations was “to ensure that the job creation which would accompany casino
developments would benefit all segments of the population” in Atlantic City, which had a large
minority population.59
Karl Schurr, a white male, sought a position as a light and sound technician at Resorts.60
Resorts’ Director of Show Operations and Stage Manager (“Director”) narrowed those under
consideration to Schurr and Ronald Boykin, a black male.61 The Director viewed the two as
equally qualified but believed he was generally obligated to hire the minority applicant if there
were two equally qualified applicants for a job category in which the percentage of minorities
was less than the goal established by the Commission regulations, as the technician job category
was.62 As a result, the Director hired Boykin.63
Schurr claimed that the Chairman of the Commission violated the Equal Protection
Clause by enforcing the Commission’s regulations establishing minority employment goals
against Schurr.64 This claim was rejected for Schurr’s lack of standing.65 Schurr also filed suit
against Resorts for violating his rights under Title VII.66
58

Id.

59

Schurr v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 498 (3d Cir. 1999).

60

Id. at 490.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id. at 488.
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Schurr v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 490 (3d Cir. 1999).

65

Id. at 496.
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The Third Circuit held that the affirmative action plan was invalid because it was not
designed to correct a manifest imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.67 In reaching
this holding, the Third Circuit noted the justification behind both the plan and the regulations
mandating the plan:
The plan itself and the regulations which mandate the plan were
not based on any finding of historical or then-current
discrimination in the casino industry or in the technician job
category; the plan was not put in place as a result of any manifest
imbalance or in response to a finding that any relevant job category
was or ever had been affected by segregation.68
The Third Circuit concluded that the “absence of any reference to or showing of past or present
discrimination in the casino industry [was] fatal [to the validity of the affirmative action plan].”69
The court’s reasoning suggests that even if there had been no discrimination within the Resorts’
technician jobs, a manifest imbalance may have existed if there had been discrimination in the
casino industry or in the technician job category generally.
In Frost v. Chrysler Motor Corporation,70 a Tenth Circuit district court explicitly
provided that an employer “may justify the adoption of an affirmative action plan without
showing a conspicuous imbalance among its own employees.”71 Chrysler had “adopted a
Marketing Investment [P]rogram [(“MIP”)] to enable it to place dealerships in those areas in

66

Id.

67

Id. at 497.

68

Id. at 497-98.

69

See id. at 498.

70

826 F. Supp. 1290 (W.D. Okla. 1993).

71

Id. at 1296.
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which it ha[d] found no private investors with sufficient capital to open a dealership.”72 Mary
Frost, a white female, applied for the Edmond Dodge dealership that was part of MIP but was
rejected at a time when she was the only qualified applicant.73 The dealership was managed by
an interim manager until a black male was selected as the dealer six months later.74 Frost filed
suit against Chrysler, claiming racial discrimination under § 1981.75 Chrysler contended that it
rejected Frost’s application for the Edmond Doge dealership pursuant to its affirmative action
policy but failed to produce evidence showing that a racial imbalance existed with respect to
people qualified for MIP.76 Consequently, the court held that Chrysler’s affirmative action plan
was invalid:
While it is true that [an employer] may justify the adoption of an
affirmative action plan without showing a conspicuous imbalance
among its own employees, [the employer] must show a
conspicuous imbalance in the particular job category. In this case,
Chrysler is attempting to remedy a conspicuous imbalance in one
job category (privately capitalized dealership owners) by
implementing an affirmative action plan in another (MIP
dealers).”77
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Id. at 1291.
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Id. at 1292, 1294.
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Id.
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Id. at 1294.
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Frost v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1290, 1296 (W.D. Okla. 1993).
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Id. at 1296-97 (citations omitted).
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II.
A.

USING EXTERNAL IMBALANCES TO JUSTIFY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PRIVATE
SCHOOLS
The Supreme Court’s Position
The Third and Tenth Circuits’ receptiveness to justifying private-employer affirmative

action with external imbalances supports justifying private-school affirmative action with
external imbalances. A more fundamental inquiry, however, is whether the Supreme Court has
definitively spoken on the issue of external imbalances in private affirmative action, regardless
of its context.78 In this subpart, I argue that the Supreme Court has not definitively resolved this
issue, even in the private employment context, because the presence of internal imbalances in
both Weber and Johnson rendered any such discussion unnecessary. I further argue that, when
viewed in light of Equal Protection caselaw, the Supreme Court dicta in Johnson weigh in favor
of using external racial imbalances to justify affirmative action by private actors, including K-12
private schools.
1.

No Definitive Resolution by the Supreme Court

The only time that the Supreme Court has even spoken on how § 1981 applies to a
private nonsectarian school is in Runyon v. McCray. 79 However, Runyon provides little
guidance to the issue at hand because it did not address how § 1981 applies to affirmative action
but addressed how § 1981 applies to traditional racial discrimination.

78

See United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 529-30 (1998) (determining

initially that a basic question of interpretation had not been definitively resolved by the Supreme
Court).
79

427 U.S. 160, 163-64 (1976).
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First and foremost, the Supreme Court has left open the possibility of justifying private
affirmative action with external imbalances by having discussed only internal-imbalance
justifications for private affirmative action. The particular plans approved in Johnson and Weber
were each justified by an internal imbalance. In Weber, the defendant’s relevant plant had a
skilled craftworker population that was 1.83% black and a local labor force that was 39%
black.80 In Johnson, “none of the 238 Skilled Craftworker positions was held by a woman.”81
The Weber majority’s understanding of “racial imbalance” as “racial imbalance in the
employer’s work force” further indicates that it only spoke to the validity of internal-imbalance
justifications for private affirmative action.82 The Johnson majority, likewise, used the phrase
“racial imbalance” to mean “racial imbalance in the employer’s work force.”
80

United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198-99 (1979).

81

Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 621 (1987).

82

The Weber majority used the phrase “racial imbalance” or a variation of it in essentially

one of three ways: 1) alone, 2) within the larger phrase of “racial imbalance in the employer’s
work force,” and 3) within its standard of “conspicuous racial imbalances in traditionally
segregated job categories.”
The first time that the Weber majority uses the phrase “racial imbalance” alone is after
stating that § 703(j) of Title VII “provides that nothing contained in Title VII ‘shall be
interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment . . . to any group because
of the race . . . of such . . . group on account of’ a de facto racial imbalance in the employer’s
work force.” United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 205-06 (1979). In support of its
inference “that Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action,” the
Weber majority then reasoned that § 703(j) of Title VII “does not state that ‘nothing in Title VII
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shall be interpreted to permit’ voluntary affirmative efforts to correct racial imbalances.” Id. at
206. By contrasting its hypothetical phrasing of § 703(j) of Title VII with the actual phrasing,
and by only emphasizing the words “require” and “permit” in the actual and hypothetical
phrasing, respectively, the Weber majority signals that the only meaningful difference between
its hypothetical phrasing and the actual phrasing the difference between the meanings of
“require” and “permit.” However, that was not the only difference between the Weber majority’s
hypothetical phrasing and the actual phrasing of § 703(j) of Title VII. The Weber majority also
used the phrase “racial imbalances” in its hypothetical provision instead of the phrase “racial
imbalance in the employer’s work force” from the actual provision. The Court’s failure to
highlight this distinction suggests that the Weber majority understands “racial imbalances” to
mean “racial imbalances in the employer’s work force.”
The Weber majority again uses “racial imbalance” and “racial imbalance in the
employer’s work force” interchangeably in footnote 5, which states: “Section 703(j) speaks to
substantive liability under Title VII, but it does not preclude courts from considering racial
imbalance as evidence of a Title VII violation. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
339-340, n. 20 (1977).” Id. at 206 n.5. Determining what the Weber majority meant this time by
“racial imbalance” can be achieved by inspecting footnote 20 of Teamsters v. United States.
Footnote 20 reasons that statistics “comparing the racial composition of an employer's work
force to the composition of the population at large” should be considered as evidence of a Title
VII violation. Thus, the Weber majority apparently also equated racial imbalance with an
internal imbalance: the imbalance in the employer’s work force as compared to the general
population.
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Third, the Weber Court desired to leave itself room to fill in the details of its affirmative
action rule: “We need not today define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and
impermissible affirmative action plans. It suffices to hold that the challenged . . . affirmative

In demonstrating that Kaiser’s plan “does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the
white employees,” the Weber majority observes that Kaiser’s plan “is not intended to maintain
racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance.” United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). To clarify this statement, the Weber majority explains that
“[p]referential selection of craft trainees at the Gramercy plant will end as soon as the percentage
of black skilled craftworkers in the Gramercy plant approximates the percentage of blacks in the
local labor force.” Id. at 208-09. It is clear that by “manifest racial imbalance” the Weber
majority again meant the internal imbalance of the employer’s work force in comparison to the
general population.
Lastly, the Weber majority uses “racial imbalance” alone in quoting from the
Congressional Record of Title VII. Id. at 206. Given that this is a quote from the Congressional
Record of Title VII, the meaning of “racial imbalance” here is presumably the same as its
meaning in Title VII, which, by its text, refers to an internal imbalance.
Thus, in designating manifest or conspicuous “racial imbalances in traditionally
segregated job categories” as proper justifications for affirmative action policies, the Weber
majority signaled approval only for racial imbalances that are both in traditionally segregated job
categories and in the employer’s workforce and not for racial imbalances in traditionally
segregated job categories regardless of whether this imbalance exists in the employer’s
workforce.
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action plan falls on the permissible side of the line.”83 The Weber majority and concurrence
even both emphasized that the plan in Weber does not represent the outer bound of what
affirmative action plans can do.84
One of the Court’s reasons for upholding the Weber affirmative action policy further
buttresses the assertion that it has left open the possibility of justifying private affirmative action
with external imbalances. In Weber, the Court upheld the affirmative action policy in dispute
partially because its purposes mirror those of Title VII, which are “[breaking] down old patterns
of racial segregation and hierarchy” and “[opening] employment opportunities for minorities
which have been traditionally closed to them.”85 The purpose of justifying affirmative action
with external imbalances also mirror those of Title VII. If the Court validates particular
affirmative action policies partially for this reason, then the Court should likewise validate
particular types of affirmative action partially for the same reason.
In both Weber and Johnson, the Court had approved of the temporary nature of the
subject affirmative action plans: the plans were not meant to maintain racial balances but simply
to eliminate racial imbalances.86 This characteristic would not necessarily be lacking in a plan
83

Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.

84

The concurrence stated that “the Court’s opinion does not foreclose other forms of

affirmative action.” Id. at 215.
85

Id. at 208-09. The Johnson majority, however, decreased the precedential weight of this

reasoning by the Weber court by equating Title VII’s purpose to finding “a manifest imbalance
in traditionally segregated job categories.” Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631
(1987).
86

See Weber, 443 U.S. at 209; Johnson, 480 U.S. at 639.
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justified by an external imbalance. In the private employment context, an affirmative action plan
that is justified by an external imbalance should not logically end when the percentage of the
target racial group in the employer’s labor force approximates that in the local labor force.
However, the plan should end when the external imbalance is not manifest. From this
perspective, an external-imbalance justification is not intended to maintain racial balance but
simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance.87
2.

Supreme Court Dicta in Johnson Weighed Against Equal Protection
Caselaw

Although the Supreme Court has not resolved the issue of using external imbalances to
justify affirmative action in private entities, the Supreme Court dicta in Johnson weigh in favor
of such justifications when viewed in light of Equal Protection caselaw.
Unlike the majority in Johnson, Justices Stevens and O’Connor comment on the scope of
approved affirmative-action justifications in their concurrences, and in fact, take opposing
stances on the very issue. Justice Stevens’ concurrence opened the door for external imbalances.
Like the Court in Weber, he “emphasize[d] that the [Johnson] opinion does not establish the
permissible outer limits of voluntary programs undertaken by employers to benefit

87

Given the Native Hawaiian focus of this Comment, it is of interest to understand how the

Ninth Circuit developed its Weber rule. The face of the Ninth Circuit’s rule clearly indicates that
the imbalance justifying an affirmative action plan must be internal to the employer. See infra
Appendix. In adopting this rule, however, the Ninth Circuit has not clearly faced the question of
whether or not external imbalances may justify an affirmative action plan.
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disadvantaged groups.”88 Justice Stevens even went so far as to suggest other possible
justifications for affirmative action plans:
Instead of retroactively scrutinizing his own or society’s possible
exclusions of minorities in the past to determine the outer limits of
a valid affirmative-action program . . . in many cases the employer
will find it more appropriate to consider other legitimate reasons to
give preferences to members of underrepresented groups. Statutes
enacted for the benefit of minority groups should not block these
forward-looking considerations.89
Most notably, Justice Stevens suggested that employers might advance the forward-looking
reason of “improving their services to black constituencies” or “averting racial tension over the
allocation of jobs in a community’” to justify their affirmative action plans.90 These
justifications are not internal to the employer because they logically can continue justifying an
employer’s affirmative action plan even after the percentage of the target racial group in the
employer’s workforce approximates that in the local workforce.91
88

Johnson, 480 U.S. at 642.

89

Id. at 646.

90

Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647 (1987).

91

As mentioned earlier, this Comment defines internal-imbalance justifications as those

that logically cease justifying an affirmative action policy once the percentage of the preferred
race in the private entity approximates that in the local area. Under this definition, past
discrimination towards blacks or a manifest lack of Asian Americans would be internalimbalance justifications because the private entity has arguably made up for the past
discrimination towards blacks or the manifest lack of Asian Americans once the percentage of
the preferred race in the entity’s population approximates that in the local area. On the other
hand, the justifications of diversity and improving services to black constituencies are external-
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Justice O’Connor’s concurrence directly opposed Justice Stevens’ concurrence:
“Contrary to the intimations in Justice Stevens’ concurrence, this Court does not approve
preferences for minorities ‘for any reason that might seem sensible from a business or a social
point of view.’”92 O’Connor pointed out that in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,93 the
Court had concluded societal discrimination without more was too amorphous a basis for
imposing a racially classified remedy: “Instead, we determined that affirmative action was valid
if it was crafted to remedy past or present discrimination by the employer.”94 In fact, “because
both Wygant and Weber attempt[ed] to reconcile the same competing concerns,” O’Connor saw
little justification to adopt different standards for affirmative action under Title VII and the Equal
Protection Clause.95
Viewed in isolation, it is difficult to determine whether these concurrences together
weigh in favor of or against permitting external imbalances to justify affirmative action in private
schools. Aside from the concurrences opposing each other on the scope of proper affirmativeaction justifications, they were both singular and unnecessary to uphold the Court’s majority
opinion. The Court also has not squarely confronted a private affirmative action case under
imbalance justifications because the private entity may continue to reap the benefits of diversity
and improving services to black constituencies, which result from its affirmative action policy,
even when the percentage of the preferred race in the private entity’s population approximates
that in the local area.
92

Id. at 649.
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Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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Johnson, 480 U.S. at 650.

95

Id. at 652.
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either Title VII or § 1981 since Johnson. Given this dearth of Supreme Court guidance in private
affirmative action, it is helpful to view the concurrences of Justice Stevens and O’Connor in light
of topical, jurisprudential developments in the Equal Protection Clause, § 1981’s governmental
counterpart.
These concurrences together weigh in favor of permitting external imbalances to justify
affirmative action in private schools because the Court has not adopted O’Connor’s position that
affirmative action by private and government actors should be subject to the same standard. In
addition, courts have approved of a wider variety of affirmative-action justifications for
government actors.
The Court not adopting the same standard for affirmative action by both private and
government actors lessens the significance of O’Connor’s observation in Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education that the Court previously had asserted only past or present discrimination by
the employer could justify affirmative action but societal discrimination could not.96
Although some of Justice Stevens’ views in Johnson either have not been confirmed97 or
have not been embraced,98 his suggestion of using forward-looking reasons as justifications for
96

Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).

97

Justice Stevens’ position that Johnson does not establish the outer limits of affirmative

action plans by private employers has not been confirmed because the Court has not heard any
private affirmative action case under either Title VII or § 1981 since Johnson.
98

Justice Stevens’ suggestion of using forward-looking justifications for affirmative action

policies has not been embraced by the lower courts. His suggestion was not discussed in Schurr
or Frost, the cases discussed in Part I.B. that appeared to accept external imbalances as
legitimate justifications of affirmative action in private employers. Justice Stevens’ suggestion
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affirmative action policies has grown firm roots in the Equal Protection context. For example, in
the companion cases of Grutter v. Bollinger99 and Gratz v. Bollinger,100 the Supreme Court used
diversity to justify affirmative action in public higher education. In Reynolds v. City of
Chicago,101 the Seventh Circuit accepted compelling public safety concerns as legitimate
justifications for affirmative action in law enforcement. Further, in Hunter v. Regents of the
University of California,102 the Ninth Circuit held that improving the quality of education in
urban public schools justified affirmative action in a public, research-oriented elementary
school.103
was even rejected by the Third Circuit in Taxman v. Board of Education, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir.
1995), a case that was decided prior to Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The Third
Circuit in Taxman determined that an employer could not use race as a factor in selecting which
of two equally qualified employees to lay off because racial diversity did not properly justify
affirmative action under Title VII.
99

539 U.S. 306 (2003).

100

539 U.S. 244 (2003).

101

1 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1993).

102

190 F.3d 1061 (1999).

103

Similarly, O’Connor’s position that the Court does not approve minority preferences for

any sensible business or social perspective but only for remedying past or present discrimination
is true insofar as most Circuits require a manifest internal imbalance to justify an affirmative
action plan under § 1981. (A manifest imbalance may be thought of as non-incriminating
evidence of past discrimination.) In turn, this position has not held true in the Equal Protection
context, as evidenced by the array of proper affirmative-action justifications noted earlier.
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The Court’s decision to treat affirmative action by private and government actors
differently also supports the assertion, made by many courts, that a private actor has more
leeway to use affirmative action than a government actor.104 Giving private actors greater ability
to use affirmative action strongly implies that private actors should be able to justify their
affirmative action policies with reasons at least as broad as those used in the Equal Protection
context. Thus, private actors should be able to justify their affirmative action policies with
reasons even broader than diversity, public safety, and improving the quality of public education.
In light of these Equal Protection Clause developments, the concurrences in Johnson weigh in
favor of permitting private schools to justify their affirmative action policies with external racial
imbalances.

104

See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (“In the area of affirmative

action, Title VII apparently is viewed as somewhat less restrictive than the Equal Protection
Clause at least insofar as voluntary affirmative action plans are concerned.”); Stuart v. Roache,
951 F.2d 446 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that plaintiff’s § 1981 claim must fail where the remedial
plan passed strict scrutiny); Kromnick v. Sch. Dist., 739 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1984) (“The scope of
Title VII is broader than that of the Constitution.”); Shuford v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 846 F.
Supp. 1511 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (“Because strict scrutiny is the ‘more restrictive’ standard and
because the court concludes that the proposed decree passes strict-scrutiny analysis, the court
need not analyze the decree separately under the standard of Title VII.”); cf. Taxman v. Bd. of
Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (“While the Supreme Court may indeed at some future date
hold that an affirmative action purpose that satisfies the Constitution must necessarily satisfy
Title VII, it has yet to do so.”).
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B.

Policy in Support of Using External Imbalances to Justify Affirmative Action in K12 Private Schools
Although policy considerations do not support using external imbalances to justify

affirmative action at all private schools, they do weigh in favor of such a use at K-12 private
schools, including the Kamehameha Schools.
1.

Most Effective Allocation of Incentives and Means to Remedy Social
Disparities

The consequence of allowing private schools to justify their affirmative action policies
only with manifest imbalances in their own student populations is the curtailment of
contributions that private schools desire to make toward remedying racial disparities.
To illustrate, consider six hypothetical private schools that are located in an area where
the academically underachieving racial group constitutes 30 percent of the population. All six
schools have been in existence for 20 years, but each has had a different admission policy, as
provided in the table below. The result of the schools having had different admission policies is
that the schools have correspondingly different student-body compositions.

School

Mission

A

No relevant mission

Admissions Policy
Discrimination
against the target
racial group until
three years ago

Percentage of
Students That
Are of the
Target Racial
Group
2%

Percentage of
Students That
Are Not of the
Target Racial
Group
98%

4%

96%

Now strictly
academic
B

No relevant mission

Discrimination
against the target
racial group until
three years ago
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Now strictly
geographic
C

No relevant mission

Strictly academic

4%

96%

D

No relevant mission

Academic with
preference for target
racial group

22%

78%

E

Mission of helping
the target racial
group’s academic
achievement

Academic with
preference for target
racial group

85%

15%

F

Mission of helping
the target racial
group’s academic
achievement

Academic with
preference for target
racial group

15%

85%

Schools A, B, and C have engaged in “traditional” discrimination, have admissions
criteria with traditionally discriminatory effects, or both. Schools A, B, and C consequently have
far smaller percentages of the target racial group in their student bodies than the percentage in
the surrounding population. In other words, schools A, B, and C have manifest imbalances in
their student bodies that could justify the use of admissions preferences for the targeted racial
group under the imported Weber rule. However, given that none of these three schools has the
mission of helping the target racial group, these schools would likely use a racial preference only
to the extent that they believe such a use would help them for other reasons, like enriching their
students’ educational experience, increasing their revenue, or increasing their prestige.
The percentage of the target racial group in school D is comparable to that in the
surrounding population because school D has used a racial admissions preference to increase
diversity in its student population. The percentage of the target racial group in school E is
actually significantly greater than that in the surrounding population because school E has used
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its racial admissions preference to better achieve its mission of helping the target racial group’s
academic achievement. Under the imported Weber rule, schools D and E would have to stop
using their racial preference because manifest imbalances do not exist in their student bodies.
Since these two schools would no longer be able to use a racial admissions preference, the
percentage of the target racial group in each of their student bodies likely would decrease. If
school D’s academic admissions criteria are as strict as those of school C, the percentage of the
target racial group in school D’s population could decrease as much as 18 percent, from its
current 22 percent to four percent – the percentage of the target racial group in school C’s
population.
Since the mission of school E is to help the target racial group’s academic achievement,
school E likely would attempt to maintain the percentage of the target racial group in its
population, even without the use of its racial admissions preference. School E may try using an
alternative admissions preference, like a low income-level admissions preference, as a proxy for
its invalidated racial admissions preference. Even so, the percentage of the target racial group in
school E’s population likely would decrease because the alternative admissions preference likely
would be an imperfect proxy for race. If this were not true and school E was a rational actor,
school E should have no problem using the alternative admissions preference in place of its
invalid racial admissions preference.
School F illustrates circumstances in which a school with the mission of helping the
target racial group’s academic achievement may have a chance of being able to continue using
its racial admissions preference under the imported Weber rule. However, school F also
illustrates how unlikely it is that such a school exists: a rational school with the mission of
helping the target racial group’s academic achievement and with the ability to use a racial
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admissions preference would have a much higher percentage of the target racial group in its
student body than school F does.
These six hypothetical schools show how, under the imported Weber rule, private schools
with the greatest incentive to remedy a racial disparity are not able to use a racial admissions
preference to maximize their contributions to remedying the disparity.105 The failure to allocate
the most effective means of remedying a racial disparity to those with the greatest motivation to
do so that results from the imported Weber rule reflects the Weber rule’s origination in cases
where the defendant private employers were like schools A, B, and C: they had engaged in
“traditional” discrimination, had a hiring process with traditionally discriminatory effects, or
both. As explained earlier, the Court simply was not faced with a private entity that existed for
the purpose of remedying a racial disparity when it decided either Weber or Johnson.
Consequently, the rule resulting from these two cases does not sensibly deal with affirmative
action in private entities existing for the purpose of remedying a racial disparity.
If, in addition to internal imbalances, private schools are permitted to justify their
affirmative action policies with external imbalances, the results described above would change
only in that schools D and E would be able to continue using their racial admissions preferences.
In effect, school E would be permitted to most effectively achieve its mission of helping the
target racial group’s academic underachievement by admitting primarily or exclusively students
of that racial group.
105

Despite the Third Circuit’s pre-Grutter decision in Taxman, it is very likely that school D

would be able to continue using its racial preference on the basis of diversity given the Supreme
Court’s approval of diversity as a justification for affirmative action in public higher education
under the Equal Protection Clause.
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2.

Basis for Treating Private K-12 Schools Differently Than Other Private
Entities Under § 1981

In this subpart, I argue that K-12 private schools should be treated differently than other
private actors under § 1981 by having the ability to use external imbalances as proper
justifications for their affirmative action policies because society benefits from more affirmative
action in K-12 private schools. Not only does such affirmative action result in more benefits
than burdens, its benefits and burdens also compare favorably to the benefits and burdens of
currently permitted forms of affirmative action.
To reach these conclusions, I assume that giving K-12 private schools the ability to use
external imbalances as proper justifications will increase the availability of K-12 private
education for academically underachieving racial groups, and I assume that K-12 private schools
are of good quality.
a.

Comparing the Benefits and Burdens of Affirmative Action in K-12 Private
Schools
If one thinks in terms of the familiar foot-race metaphor, it was not
enough to say: “From now on, everyone may compete on equal
terms, and may the race go to the swiftest.” If, as a result of
centuries of illegal discrimination, one large class of contestants is
fifty yards behind the other contestants’ starting line when the gun
is fired, the race cannot be considered fair merely because from
now on no further special handicaps are imposed. Equality has not
been achieved until something has been done to bring the
disadvantaged contestants up to the starting line. In short, it is not
enough for those who have discriminated illegally to stop what
they are doing – they must also undo the effects of their past
discrimination.106
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LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 62.01 (2005), available at LEXIS, 3-62

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 62.02.
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That some types of affirmative action policies have been sanctioned essentially represents
a policy judgment that, in some cases, the benefit to society of bringing “the disadvantaged
contestants up to the starting line” outweighs the burden to society of “trammeling” the
“majority” racial group or gender.107 I contend that the benefits of affirmative action in
Kamehameha Schools and other private K-12 schools outweigh its burdens.
The primary benefit of permitting K-12 private schools to justify their affirmative action
policies with external imbalances is to increase or to encourage increased availability of good K12 education for academically underachieving racial groups. In turn, so long as children of
academically underachieving racial groups can take advantage of any increased availability108 of
good K-12 education,109 more of these children will have obtained a good K-12 education than
would otherwise have been able to. The quality of a person’s K-12 education significantly
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See Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77

N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1195, 1269 (2002) (“[T]he divisive effects of undoing injustice must be weighed
against the divisive effects of leaving it intact.”).
108

When there exists schools with the mission of remedying a racial disparity, like the

Kamehameha Schools, increased availability rather than an encouraged increase of availability
would result from permitting K-12 private schools to justify their affirmative action policies with
external imbalances.
109

At least with the Kamehameha Schools, Native Hawaiians’ ability to afford attending the

Schools is not a significant issue. Backed by “one of the world’s wealthiest charities,” the
“Schools subsidize much of the educational costs [of their students] through funds held in trust.”
See Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 416 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2005).
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influences her ability to undertake and succeed in higher education:110 even by as early as the end
of third grade, “[b]oth U.S. . . . and cross-national data . . . suggest that, children are launched
into achievement trajectories that they follow the rest of their school years.”111 With increased
educational attainment, the beneficiaries of affirmative action in K-12 private schools likely will
have greater earnings,112 a healthier life,113 and a longer life114 than they would have had if only
internal imbalances legitimately justified affirmative action in K-12 private schools.
110

Laura W. Perna, The Key to College Access: Rigorous Academic Preparation, in

PREPARING FOR COLLEGE: NINE ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE OUTREACH 113, 131 (William G.
Tierney, et al. eds., 2005) (“[T]he process of becoming academically qualified to enroll in
college begins as early as eighth grade,” and “[r]esearch shows the benefits of promoting highquality academic preparation prior to the high school years” in preparing for college.); Goodwin
Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 HOW. L.J. 705, 706 (2004) ([T]he path to leadership
begins . . . in high-quality elementary and secondary schools that are too rarely found in
communities where minority students live.”); see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1981) (Both
the importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its
deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction [of education from other forms of social
welfare legislation].”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Compulsory school
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society.”).
111

KARL L. ALEXANDER & DORIS R. ENTWISLE, ACHIEVEMENT IN THE FIRST 2 YEARS OF

SCHOOL: PATTERNS AND PROCESSES 1 (1988).
112

See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS

STATISTICAL BRIEF: MORE EDUCATION MEANS HIGHER CAREER EARNINGS 1 (1994), available at
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The burdens of using external imbalances to justify affirmative action in private schools
are minimal. As discussed earlier, the significant consequence of allowing external-imbalance
justifications, in addition to internal-imbalance justifications, is that private schools with the
mission of remedying a racial disparity can continue using their racial preferences to achieve
their mission. Whether the racial preferences result in exclusive or primary admission of the
preferred racial group, the burden on the non-preferred racial group remains having either little
or no chance of attending private schools with the mission of remedying a racial disparity.
Denial of admissions would unsettle no legitimate, firmly rooted expectation on the part of the
applicant of attending that private school.115 In addition, the applicant would still be virtually
guaranteed admittance to a K-12 school, as provided by the government.116

http://www.census.gov/apsd/www/statbrief/sb94_17.pdf (“[M]ore education means greater
earnings over a year’s time.”).
113

See Eileen M. Crimmins & Yasuhiko Saito, Trends in Healthy Life Expectancy in the

United States,1970–1990: Gender, Racial ,and Educational Differences, 52 Social Science &
Medicine 1629, 1636 (2001) (providing data that demonstrates a positive correlation between
years of school completed with both total life expectancy and healthy life expectancy for whites
and blacks of both genders).
114

Id.

115

See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987).

116

See Pherabe Kolb, Comment: Reaching for the Silver Lining: Constructing a

Nonremedial yet “Exceedingly Persuasive” Rationale for Single-Sex Educational Programs in
Public Schools, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 367, 378-81 (2001) (“[T]he laws governing colleges and
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Although classifying people solely on the basis of race may “threaten to stigmatize
individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group,” threaten “to incite racial hostility,”
and exacerbate the very conditions that the policy is intended to counteract, racial classifications
are nonetheless currently permitted, albeit only in certain circumstances.117 Thus, as noted
earlier, that racial classifications are permitted in certain circumstances reflects a judgment that,
in those circumstances, the benefits to society of the racial classification outweighs its burdens,
including the potential stigma, hostility, and exacerbation that may result. Furthermore,
“rejecting an affirmative action policy for fear of racial stigmatization and hostility implies a
judgment that existing types of stigmatization and hostility in society are more tolerable.” 118
Academically underachieving racial groups “could argue that they are already stigmatized by the
. . . group’s high rate of poverty and unemployment and low level of educational and
professional attainment.”119
In sum, the benefit of smaller racial disparities in education, income, quality and length
of life that results from increasing the ability of academically underachieving racial groups to
obtain good K-12 education outweighs the burden of the non-preferred race’s unchanged
expectations as to their chances of admittance to private schools with the mission of remedying
racial disparities and the burden of continuing racial stigma and hostility, which may be of a
different nature but not necessarily of a different strength than would otherwise be present.

universities should not be applied without amendment to the elementary or secondary school
context.”).
117

Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 416 F.3d 1025, 1042.

118

RECENT CASE, supra note 28, at 667-68.

119

Id.
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b.

Comparing Affirmative Action in K-12 Private Schools to CurrentlyPermitted Forms of Affirmative Action

I contend that society enjoys greater benefits from having more affirmative action in K12 private schools and correspondingly less affirmative action in higher education and
employment because affirmative action in K-12 private schools results in relatively greater
benefits and lesser burdens. This rests on the assumption that there will not be an increase in the
total quantity of affirmative action as a result of permitting external balances to justify
affirmative action in K-12 private schools. In other words, any increased amount of affirmative
action in private K-12 schools will be offset by an equal or greater decrease of affirmative action
in employment and higher education.
The benefits of affirmative action in K-12 private schools are greater than affirmative
action in higher education and employment because the advantage conferred by affirmative
action in K-12 private schools, by definition, occurs earlier in a person’s life. Thus, beneficiaries
of affirmative action in K-12 private schools have a longer period in which to reap the benefits of
the conferred advantage. In addition, whereas affirmative action in higher education and
employment arguably gives the beneficiary the advantage of slightly lowered admittance or
hiring standards, affirmative action in K-12 private schools gives the beneficiary the advantage
of fundamental skills and knowledge.
Affirmative action in private K-12 schools is less burdensome than affirmative action in
higher education and employment because the government has undertaken the responsibility to
educate children in grades K-12.120 Whereas, there may not be another university, graduate

120

See Kolb, supra note 111, at 378-381 (“[S]tates are required to provide an intangible

amount of education to all public school children.”); cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1981)
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school, or workplace to which a person burdened by a currently permitted affirmative action
policy may turn, the government virtually guarantees a school for which children burdened by a
private school’s affirmative action policy may attend.121
Lastly, because the advantage conferred by affirmative action in K-12 private schools is
not a “double standard” but fundamental skills and knowledge and because a child will always
have a K-12 school that she can attend, people of the non-preferred race are likely to feel less
trammeled by affirmative action in K-12 private schools than in higher education or
employment.
IV.

CONCLUSION

K-12 private schools, including the Kamehameha Schools, should be able to primarily
admit students of an academically underperforming racial group because this is the most
effective allocation of incentives and means for remedying racial disparities. Such affirmative
action better remedies racial disparities than presently-permitted forms of affirmative action
because it confers greater benefits and lesser burdens on society. As a consequence, society
would benefit from encouraging affirmative action policies in K-12 private schools by giving
these schools the ability to justify their policies with external imbalances.

(“Public education is not a ‘right’ granted to individuals by the Constitution. But neither is it
merely some governmental "benefit" indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare
legislation.”) (citation omitted).
121

See Kolb, supra note 111, at 378-381 (“[T]he laws governing colleges and universities

should not be applied without amendment to the elementary or secondary school context.”).
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APPENDIX: SURVEY OF RULES GOVERNING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS
Rule

Plan’s Justifications

Plan’s Limitations

First
Circuit

First, it must be a temporary
measure, not designed to
maintain racial balance but to
eliminate a manifest racial
imbalance.122 Second, it must
not unnecessarily trammel the
interests of the white
employees nor create an
absolute bar to the
advancement of white
employees.123

Eliminating a
manifest racial
imbalance

Being a
temporary
measure
Not maintaining
racial balance
Being designed
to achieve its
goal
Not unnecessarily
trammeling the
interests of the
white employees
Not creating an
absolute bar to
the advancement
of white
employees

Second
Circuit

The court looks to whether
there is a history of
discrimination resulting in a
workforce imbalance, whether
the plan is temporary in nature,
whether it is narrowly tailored
to correct the imbalance, and

“[R]emedy[ing] a
history of
discrimination
resulting in a
workforce
imbalance”125

Being temporary
in nature
Being narrowly
tailored to
achieve its goal
Not unnecessarily
trammeling the

122

Bertoncini v. City of Providence, 767 F. Supp. 1194, 1201 (D.R.I. 1991).

123

Id.; cf. Petitti v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 816, at

*13-14 (D. Mass. 1988) (“[T]he validity of such a plan turns on three issues: (1) whether the
plan was ‘justified by a manifest imbalance that reflected under-representation of women in
traditionally segregated job categories,’; (2) ‘whether the . . . [p]lan unnecessarily trammeled the
rights of male employees or created an absolute bar to their advancement,’; and (3) whether the
plan was intended to attain, rather than maintain, a balanced work force.”) (citations omitted).
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the extent to which it affects
the rights of third parties.124
Third
Circuit

rights of third
parties126

Title VII's prohibition against
racial discrimination is not
violated by affirmative action
plans which, first, have
purposes that mirror those of
the statute and second, do not
unnecessarily trammel the
interests of the non-minority
employees.127

Correcting a
manifest
imbalance in
traditionally
segregated job
categories, which
in turn, is a
remedial purpose
that mirrors those
of the statute

Being designed
to achieve its
goal
Not unnecessarily
trammeling the
interest of the
non-minority
employee

For an affirmative action plan
to have purposes that mirror
those of the statute, the
purpose must be remedial, like
remedying the segregation and
124

Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 74 F. Supp. 2d 321, 338 (S.D.N.Y.

1999), aff’d 310 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Bushey v. N.Y. State Civil Serv. Comm’n, 733
F.2d 220, 227-28 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1117 (permitting affirmative action plan
under Title VII “when[] the job category in question is traditionally segregated” and when the
plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the nonminority employees) (1985); cf.
Honadle v. Univ. of Vt. & State Agric. Coll., 56 F. Supp. 2d 419, 425 (D. Va. 1999) (“[A]n
employer could lawfully make race-conscious employment decisions to eliminate manifest racial
imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories, as long as the plan does not unnecessarily
trammel the interests of the white employees.”).
125

Patrolmen’s, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 338.

126

Bushey, 773 F.2d at 228.

127

Schurr v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 497 (3d Cir. 1999); Taxman v. Board of

Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1554-55 (3d Cir. 1996).
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underrepresentation of
minorities that discrimination
has caused in the nation’s
workforce.128 However, for an
affirmative action to be
remedial, it must be designed
to correct a manifest imbalance
in traditionally segregated job
categories.129
Fourth
and
Fifth
Circuit
s

An employer's voluntary
affirmative action plan is not a
violation of Title VII if (1) its
purpose is similar to that of
Title VII, namely to "break
down old patterns" of
discrimination; (2) the plan
does not "unnecessarily
trammel" the rights of those
outside the group that it is
designed to protect; and (3) it
is designed to eliminate a
manifest racial or sexual
imbalance.130

Breaking down
old patterns of
discrimination131
Eliminating a
manifest racial or
sexual imbalance

Not unnecessarily
trammeling the
rights of those
outside the group
that it is designed
to protect
Being designed
to eliminate a
manifest racial or
sexual imbalance

128

Schurr, 196 F.3d at 497; Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1557.

129

Schurr, 196 F.3d at 497; Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1556.

130

Smith v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 84 F.3d 672, 676 (4th Cir. 1996); Messer v. Meno,

936 F. Supp. 1280, 1293 (W.D. Texas 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 130 F.3d 130 (5th Cir.
1997); cf. Lilly v. Beckley, 797 F.2d 191, 194 (4th Cir. 1986) (“[Test drawn from Weber]
inquires whether the plan contains safeguards necessary to avoid trammelling the rights of nonminorities, whether the plan is designed to remedy past discrimination, and whether the plan is
temporary.”).
131

This is considered to be a purpose similar to that of Title VII in the Fifth Circuit. See

Messer, 936 F. Supp. at 1293.
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Sixth
Circuit

“Weber stands for the general
proposition that voluntary
affirmative action is proper if it
is designed to eliminate
reasonable under all of the
circumstances.”132 A plan is
reasonable if it is like the plan
in Weber in that it: 1) is
temporary; 2) is not intended to
maintain racial balance but
simply to eliminate a
conspicuous racial imbalance
in traditionally segregated job
categories; and 3) does not
"unnecessarily trammel" the
interests of white employees
because it does not cause any
whites to be dismissed and
does not absolutely bar whites
from advancement.133

Reasonable goal
under all the
circumstances
Eliminating a
manifest racial
imbalance

Reasonable
limitations under
all the
circumstances
Being temporary
Not maintaining
a racial balance
Not unnecessarily
trammeling the
interests of white
employees by
causing whites to
be dismissed or
absolutely
barring white
from
advancement

Sevent
h
Circuit

“An affirmative action plan is
valid under Title VII if it (1) is
adopted and designed to
correct ‘manifest racial
imbalances in traditionally
segregated job categories,’ and
(2) does not ‘unnecessarily
trammel the interests of white
employees.’”134

Correcting a
manifest racial
disparity in some
part of the
employer’s
workforce

Being designed
to achieve its
goal
Not unduly
trammeling the
interests of white
employees

The Seventh Circuit interprets
a manifest racial imbalance in
132

Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 930, 983 (E.D. Mich. 1979), aff’d sub nom. Bratton

v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1982).
133

Id. at 983, 986; cf. Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 689 (6th Cir.

1979) (“The test under Title VII of voluntary affirmative action is whether the action is
consistent with the anti-discrimination policy of the statute.”), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981).
134

McNamara v. City of Chicago, 867 F. Supp. 739, 749 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
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traditionally segregated job
categories to mean a manifest
racial disparity in some part of
the employer’s workforce.135
Eighth
Circuit

“The first burden on the
employer in a reverse
discrimination suit is to
produce some evidence that its
affirmative action program was
a response to a conspicuous
racial imbalance in its work
force and is remedial.”136 “The
second burden on the employer
in a reverse discrimination suit

Responding to a
conspicuous
racial imbalance
in its work force
Being remedial
Being reasonably
related to such
considerations as
the racial
imbalance of the

Being remedial
Being reasonably
related to the
plan’s remedial
purpose

135

Id. at 752.

136

Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 968 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064

(1981); cf. Maitland v. Univ. of Minn., 155 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that an
affirmative action hiring plan may not be successfully challenged as a violation of Title VII, if
the consideration of an otherwise improper factor was justified by the existence of a manifest
imbalance that reflected underrepresentation of the minority in traditionally segregated job
categories, if the employment plan did not unnecessarily trammel the rights of male employees,
and if the employment plan was intended to attain a balance, not to maintain one), cert. denied,
535 U.S. 929 (2002); Sisco v. J. S. Alberici Constr. Co., 655 F.2d 146, 149 (8th Cir. 1981)
(“[A]n employer who in good faith applies an affirmative-action plan to remedy past
discrimination is not in violation of either Title VII or Section 1981, so long as the plan lasts no
longer than necessary ‘to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance,’ ‘does not unnecessarily
trammel the interests of the white employees,’ ‘does not require the discharge of white workers
and their replacement with new black hirees,’ and does not ‘create an absolute bar to the
advancement of white employees.’”), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982).
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Ninth
Circuit

is to produce some evidence
that its affirmative action plan
is reasonably related to the
plan's remedial purpose.”137

work force, the
availability of
qualified
applicants, and
the number of
employment
opportunities
available

An affirmative action plan
must: 1) respond to a manifest
imbalance in its work force, 2)
not create an absolute bar to
the advancement of the nonpreferred race or unnecessarily
trammel their rights, and 3) do
no more than is necessary to
achieve a balance.138

Responding to a
manifest
imbalance in its
work force.

Not creating an
absolute bar to
the advancement
of the nonpreferred race
Not unnecessarily
trammeling their
rights
Doing no more
than is necessary
to achieve a
balance.

137

Setser, 657 F.2d at 968-69.

138

Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d 506, 520-21 (9th Cir. 2002); Doe v. Kamehameha, 416

F.3d 1025, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005); cf. Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438,
1448 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Where a finding of manifest imbalance justifies a consent decree's
affirmative relief, the decree may be approved provided it does not ‘unnecessarily trammel the
interests of the White employees’ or create an ‘absolute bar to the advancement of White
employees.’”); Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 356-57 (9th Cir. 1987) (analyzing
whether affirmative action plan complied with Title VII depended on whether consideration of
the sex of applicants for skilled craft jobs was justified by the existence of a manifest imbalance
that reflected underrepresentation of women in traditionally segregated job categories and
whether the Agency Plan unnecessarily trammeled the rights of male employees or created an
absolute bar to their advancement”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1051 (1989).
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Tenth
and
Elevent
h
Circuit
s

First, the plan must be justified
by a conspicuous or manifest
imbalance in traditionally
segregated job categories; 139
and second, the plan must not
unnecessarily trammel the
rights of the non-minority or
create an absolute bar to their
advancement.140

Responding to a
conspicuous or
manifest
imbalance in
traditionally
segregated job
categories, which
must reflect the
underrepresentati
on of women or
minorities in the
Eleventh Circuit

Not unnecessarily
trammeling the
rights of the
nonminority
Not creating an
absolute bar to
their
advancement.

DC
Circuit

Title VII will permit privatesector voluntary affirmative
action under the following
circumstances, and perhaps
others:

Eliminating a
manifest racial
imbalance

Not unnecessarily
trammeling the
interests of the
white employees
Not requiring the
discharge of
white workers
and their replacement with
new black hirees
Not creating an
absolute bar to
the advancement
of white
employees
Being a
temporary
measure
Not maintaining
a racial balance

The plan does not
unnecessarily trammel the
interests of the white
employees. The plan does not
require the discharge of white
workers and their re-placement
with new black hirees. Nor
does the plan create an
absolute bar to the
advancement of white
employees; half of those
trained in the program will be
white. Moreover, the plan is a
temporary measure; it is not
intended to maintain racial
139

The imbalance must reflect the underrepresentation of women or minorities in the

Eleventh Circuit. See In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d
1492, 1500 (11th Cir. 1987).
140

See id. at 1500; Frost v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1290, 1296 (W.D. Okl.

1993); Cunico v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 917 F.2d 431, 437 (10th Cir. 1990).
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balance but simply to eliminate
a manifest racial imbalance.141

141

Dougherty v. Barry, 607 F. Supp. 1271, 1286 (D.C. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 869

F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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